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Crisis Group consultant interviews in former capacity, Aden, August These recruits continued to carry out high-profile attacks, including a suicide bombing against a government military recruitment centre in the port city on 29 August that killed over The same official later killed in a U. Crisis Group consultant multimedia interviews in former capacity, November , March Hide Footnote Later, AQAP leaders publicly criticised IS, denouncing its attacks on mosques, which they contrasted with their own reputed sensitivity to local norms.

They also engaged in a broader media campaign, ridiculing IS and al-Baghdadi, its self-proclaimed caliph. AQAP video release, 1 November They rise up when the group moves in from the outside to jointly take control of a place. Their brutal tactics, including mass killings and mosque bombings, and their relatively autocratic style, are at odds with societal and tribal norms. In December , IS faced an internal mutiny when fifteen senior figures and 55 fighters accused their leader, the governor wali of Yemen province, of violating Sharia.

Hide Footnote Rejecting the letter, all 70 members left the group. On 24 December, an additional 31, including three senior figures, released a statement joining the rebellion and renouncing the IS leader in Yemen. IS continues to carry out suicide bombings in the government-controlled cities of Aden and Mukalla and also engages in assassinations of local security and intelligence personnel that have a significant impact. This and repeated IS suicide bombings of military recruitment centres and mass gatherings of soldiers collecting salaries have led many southerners to view IS as part of a historical pattern in which northern political elites use violent jihadists as a tool in asymmetric warfare against the south.

Crisis Group consultant observations in former capacity; and interviews, Hiraak activists, Aden and Mukalla, August December Its longstanding presence and well-established networks across the country have given it a clear upper hand. Fault lines between groups are increasingly unclear and many have no visible structure. Individuals and fighting factions often assume tribal, political and religious identities simultaneously. Attempts at simplification are often misleading while making any future reintegration of armed groups problematic. The label Salafi is similarly vulnerable to these errors and underlines the need for disaggregation.

Increasing fragmentation throughout the civil war has resulted in open conflict between Salafi strands. Hide Footnote Yemen has long housed a variety of Salafi groups. Quietist, scholastic or missionary Salafis are apolitical, reject parliamentary politics and, in theory, give allegiance to existing authority. Salafi-jihadists advocate violence against religious and political enemies. And activist Salafis are more inclined to challenging authorities through the political process.

Crisis Group consultant phone interview, Laurent Bonnefoy, July See Laurent Bonnefoy, Salafism in Yemen: Transnationalism and Religious Identity London, Hide Footnote Prior to the war, most were non-political and non-violent. Some, like the al-Rashad party, embraced politics and were closely associated with Islah. As the Huthis expanded southward, however, many took up arms against them. The earliest indications of this were in , when the Huthis fought Salafis from the Dar al-Hadith religious institute in Dammaj, Saada. Salafi proselytising there, itself arguably a product of socio-economic grievances against advantages given to Zaydi elites, particularly Hashemites descendants of the Prophet , is a core grievance that sparked Zaydi revivalism in the s and later gave impetus to the Huthi movement.

Defusing the Saada Time Bomb , 27 May Hide Footnote Although the Huthis emerged victorious in January , fighters from Dammaj and another religious institute in Kitaf, Saada, regrouped and are now fighting the Huthis on a number of fronts. Opportunistic alliances forged by the Saudi-led coalition have propelled Salafis to prominence. In Aden, they act with UAE support as state-sponsored, irregular security forces.

In , the al-Mehdhar Brigade, based in Sheikh Othman and Mansoura districts, acted as a local security force. In October , the group joined other Saudi-supported Yemeni forces in crossing the Saudi-Yemeni border in an attempt to push into Saada, the Huthi stronghold. Another group, the Security Belt forces, a UAE-supported militia established by presidential decree in May to help secure Aden and led by Nabil Mashwashi, a former South Yemen army commander, appears to have a significant Salafi component.

Crisis Group interview, September Hide Footnote As in Aden, Salafis are at the forefront of Saudi-led coalition-sponsored efforts to repel Huthi advances.

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Crisis Group interviews, Taiz politician, August ; prominent Sheikh from the Hashid tribal confederation, September Crisis Group consultant phone interviews in former capacity, Taizi activists, journalist, September Hide Footnote Since December , Salafi and other resistance militias have nominally been integrated into the Yemeni army while remaining separate in reality. It is unclear how relationships between AQAP and various Salafi groups will develop and what, if any, political ambitions the latter have beyond defeating the Huthis.

Their growth into a pivotal player in the civil war elevates the need for their representation in any political resolution, especially if they are to play a role as an alternative, among religious conservatives, to AQAP or IS. The UAE complicates this picture: Crisis Group consultant phone interviews in former capacity, Islah-aligned, pro-unity Mukalla residents, October Hide Footnote Islah, like Islamist groups actively engaged in politics across the Arab world, can play an essential role as firewall against radicalisation in Yemen.

While the UAE officially supports its inclusion in any political settlement, its intolerance of Islah in practice risks pushing young men who might have chosen politics into the arms of the very violent jihadist groups the UAE wants to quash. While U. At a regional level, the undertow of the Saudi-Iranian rivalry drives sectarianism and incites radicalisation on both sides of the war.

Without de-escalation between them, it risks becoming an extension of a wider competition between, on one side, Iran and its allies in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon — with Russia also playing a role — and the predominantly Sunni powers of the Saudi-led coalition, backed by Western states, including Israel.

Dialling back this regional enmity is a vital priority. Within Yemen, achieving a sustainable ceasefire and nationwide political settlement should be the priority. To reverse the growth of AQAP and IS will require a political settlement that is truly inclusive, provides a mechanism for addressing demands for local autonomy and outlines interim security arrangements that are accepted by local communities while operating under the umbrella of the state.

Including a range of Sunni Islamists, particularly Islah and Salafi groups prepared to engage in politics, in power-sharing arrangements would give them a stake in national politics and a viable political outlet as opposed to marginalising them and potentially pushing some toward violent jihadism. Overcoming zero-sum perspectives requires, as a first step, a compromise in which each side can be part of the government and security apparatus. Addressing demands for regional autonomy would also be crucial to rolling back AQAP.

This local view of AQAP greatly contributed to the success of efforts by intelligence agencies in routing members who went into hiding after the April offensive. Crisis Group consultant interviews in former capacity, Hiraak activists, Mukalla, March Three of them, who were listed by the Hadi government as wanted AQ members, acknowledged they were fighting alongside AAS but denied being members. They cited corruption and cronyism as primary grievances against the government.

The jihadists were eventually pushed out, with some leaving through negotiations. Crisis Group consultant interviews in former capacity, Aden, March Clear interim security arrangements are a critical part of any effective settlement. This issue has been a sticking point in UN-led negotiations. Yet, their continued presence in contested areas and dominance in the north, to the exclusion of other constituencies, exacerbates communal tensions that radical groups could also take advantage of. In the short term, Yemen needs clear interim security arrangements that are tailored to local political realities.

Areas like Taiz will be most difficult to tackle, as warring forces are positioned in close quarters on the battlefield and can each claim acceptance from certain parts of the local community.

Bringing together locally accepted combatants under the umbrella of local authorities acting on behalf the state would be ideal, at least until the overarching issues of military-security reform and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration can be addressed nationally. Even if the UN is able to broker a deal, it is unlikely to result in a quick end to this multifaceted conflict with regional dimensions. Addressing state orchestration of jihadist groups. Improving governance in areas previously under, or vulnerable to, militant control.

It has prioritised providing security, basic services and a judicial system able to resolve grievances, such as long-running land disputes, showing itself as a viable, better alternative to the state. As a priority, this includes quick and non-corrupt dispute resolution, security provision rather than predatory score-settling and basic services such as electricity and water. Aden stands out in many ways as an example of what not to do. Tensions are high between them and forces aligned with Hadi and his interior minister, Hussein al-Arab.

The Security Belt forces technically fall under the interior minister, though the degree to which he controls them is questionable. All factions are competing for Emirati patronage and support. Overlaying the competition is a historical division from the civil war in which a group from the current governorates of Dalia and Lahi won over their adversaries, mainly from Abyan and Shebwa.

Hadi and al-Arab are associated with the latter, while the Aden governor and his security chief are associated with the former. Crisis Group consultant interviews, more than a half a dozen Aden residents, the Aden governor and Aden security chief, Aden, January The experience in Abyan is a cautionary tale of how working through local militias without a clear plan for incorporating them into the state security forces or deploying them to help stabilise areas retaken from jihadists can backfire. Local militias known as popular committees were central to the U.

Their use yielded the short-term gain of driving AQAP out, but as the only force in charge of security they contributed to local tensions, entrenched exclusionary patronage networks and were vulnerable to infiltration by violent jihadists, who used them as a cover to establish networks for future resurgence.

Crisis Group consultant interview in former capacity, Aden, June There were exceptions, notably in northern Abyan areas such as Lawder, where local militias were well-liked and more representative of local communities. Crisis Group consultant interviews in former capacity, local residents, Lawder, May According to a resident of Jaar, the UAE and its local partners, most of which seek southern separation, had some success in pushing AQAP into the neighbouring governorate of al-Bayda in , but there are still far too few government-provided services and an unmet desire for governance.

Mukalla appears to show improvement. Some Hadramis say that the population is now working with the UAE and local security forces to identify and apprehend remaining AQAP supporters in the city and that services, such as water and electricity, are working well. Hide Footnote Still, the success was almost immediately followed by accusations of corruption, cronyism, arbitrary detention and torture by the new authorities and security forces.

Non-secessionist residents and those politically aligned to Islah continue to complain of unlawful arrests, torture and disappearances at the hands of the new Elite security forces a group similar to the Security Belt in Aden that is composed of local fighters trained by the UAE and UAE troops. Disaggregating rather than conflating Sunni Islamist groups. AQAP is an internally diverse organisation with varying layers of support among the local population and shifting alliances. Its efforts to blend in with the larger Sunni community and to ease affiliation requirements especially the loyalty oath expand its influence even as they leave it vulnerable to efforts to peel off supporters motivated less by its global agenda than by local political or economic grievances.

Protagonists on both sides of the war have at times been quick to label a wide range of Sunni Islamists — from Islah to various Salafi and other fighting groups — as AQAP, instead of acknowledging clear differences between them. We are not al-Qaeda but joined with them to fight [Security Director] Shalal because we have no choice. We fought and died for our city for six months and they offered us nothing in return. They gave positions to their friends and families, stole money meant for us and treated us like garbage to be thrown away or burnt.

As a politician from Abyan noted:. Ansar al-Sharia was born of al-Qaeda but is different. Most Ansar followers in Abyan are local. Many are young men who are very poor with no prospects. You can strike agreements with them and pull them away from al-Qaeda. After al-Qaeda was removed from Abyan, Ansar supporters stayed behind.

It is important to give them [political and economic] opportunities. Understanding who can be negotiated with and convinced to peacefully participate in political and social life is tricky and a shifting target that requires buy-in and expertise from local communities. Using military tools judiciously. A tactic that has proved more effective is the threat of force combined with local negotiations with militants to encourage core AQAP supporters to leave areas, particularly cities, thereby sparing population centres widespread destruction and taking the fight against combatants unwilling to negotiate to less-populated areas.

For the most part, this happened in Mukalla, and with considerable success. In Yemen, foreign troops, particularly Western ones, and even fighters from a different region of the country, risk antagonising local populations that view them as invaders. Even when local fighters are used, they can become part of the problem if they are operating outside of a clear legal framework.

Drones, too, should be used judiciously and in coordination with Yemeni authorities so as not to violate sovereignty. While the Hadi government and the civil war have given the U. Their use raises the additional risk of replacements becoming increasingly hard-line. This is especially the case with U. The first military actions by the Trump administration in Yemen bode poorly for the prospect of smartly and effectively countering AQAP. A 29 January U. Special Forces raid in al-Bayda governorate, a critical battleground between pro- and anti-Huthi forces, killed a U. Hide Footnote The use of U.

They are part of a regional trend of religiously-justified violence that is making conflict resolution evermore elusive. Instead, this multifaceted struggle looks set to deepen confessional divides — not previously a focal point of conflict — to the benefit of AQAP and IS and detriment of the country, its people and global security.

A 29 October suicide bombing in the heart of Tunis dealt a blow to much-improved security since the last violent jihadist attacks in Ayari says it has also hammered a new wedge into Islamist-secularist political divides. On 29 October, a suicide bomber set off an improvised explosive device in her backpack on Habib Bourguiba Avenue in downtown Tunis — the city's best-known thoroughfare, a few hundred metres from the ministry of interior and the French embassy. The explosion killed her and wounded twenty bystanders, including fifteen policemen who appear to have been the intended target. For now, no group has claimed responsibility for the bombing.

The year-old woman — an unemployed graduate with an English degree from a small village near Mahdia, on the Mediterranean, who occasionally worked as a shepherdess — left no indication as to her motive. This is the first major terrorist attack to take place in Tunis since , a year when multiple major attacks in the capital and other locations shook the country, targeting parliament, members of the security forces, and foreign tourists. Then, the concern was about ISIS and other jihadist groups that had made clear their intention to destabilise Tunisia's fledging democratic experiment.

Tunisia is much more secure today than it was then. Since the last major ISIS attack in Tunisia in March — when Tunisian members of the group in Libya tried to seize control of Ben Guerdane , a trading town on the Libyan border — security forces have greatly enhanced their capacity to go after jihadist groups, in part with international backing. The security vacuum that existed in the aftermath of the uprising no longer prevails, ISIS has suffered major defeats in Libya, Syria and Iraq, and while attacks against military and police occur regularly on the mountainous border with Algeria, security has vastly improved in the rest of the country.

Beyond the dead and wounded, the most important impact may be political. It was striking to see some Tunisian media immediately seek to place blame for the attack on An-Nahda, the Islamist party that has been a key partner in the governing coalition in place since early Essebsi's first statement on the bombing was also telling: That statement was widely seen by his rivals as seeking to score points against his opponents — and indeed a blame game of sorts is taking place. Essebsi has sought for over a year to dismiss Chahed, but has been unable to muster enough support from both his own party, Nida Tounes, and his main coalition partner An-Nahda to do so.

An-Nahda, which had initially backed Essebsi, has switched sides and since this summer backs Chahed — or at least does not want him to step down for the moment. The backdrop to this are looming parliamentary and presidential elections in in which both men could run , deep divisions in Nida Tounes between Essebsi's and Chahed's partisans, and the future of the consensus between Islamists and non-Islamists that Essebsi and Nahda leader Rached Ghannouchi were key in brokering in As a result, on 24 September, after months of simmering tensions, Essebsi declared that the consensus with Nahda was over.

The return of sharp polarisation swiftly followed, including explosive accusations by the far-left Popular Front party that Nahda has a secret military wing and had a hand in political assassinations carried out by jihadist groups in The political crisis is paralysing Tunisia.

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The country seems unable to make the tough decisions to tackle a lingering economic crisis. It is late in nominating the members of the electoral commission that will oversee the elections. It has also not yet nominated the members of the constitutional court, a crucial institution under the constitution, widely hailed as the most liberal in the Arab world. The rising political polarisation is making it increasingly difficult for parliament to go through with these crucial steps and is discrediting the political class among ordinary Tunisians, particularly as they suffer from rising costs of living.

Tunisia cannot really afford to lack an effective government or to botch preparations for what will only be the second democratic elections in its history. It very likely will. The end of the consensus announced by Essebsi appears to have removed political safeguards against excessive polarisation.

Among ordinary people I spoke to, it was striking to see that many viewed yesterday's attack as expected, almost an outgrowth of the political crisis. Nahda's detractors interpreted it as a warning shot from the Islamist party. Finally, members of the security forces and their backers are seizing on the attack as an opportunity to revive a draft "law for the protection of armed forces" that, in its latest draft at least, appears to grant vast powers and impunity to the police and has been roundly condemned by civil society groups.

The attack is encouraging the authoritarian drift that has been increasingly in the air for the past year, and indeed may incentivise jihadist groups, which had every reason to be demoralised after the setbacks they suffered in recent years, to carry out further attacks to exploit political divisions.

The casualty toll in this article was updated on 31 October, up from nine wounded as originally reported on 30 October. This site uses cookies. By continuing to browse the site you are agreeing to our use of cookies. Review our privacy policy for more details. Interpreting the U. Talks with the Taliban. Andes Central America. What We Heard in Caracas. Crisis Group Yemen Update 3. End the war by agreeing to a ceasefire followed by negotiations toward a political settlement that contains: Avoid sectarian language and end media campaigns and mosque sermons that label adversaries in sectarian terms.

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Where there are opportunities to open lines of communication with AQAP leaders independent of tribal or political elites, those should be explored and if possible used to help de-escalate violence. Prioritise basic security, justice — particularly quick and transparent dispute resolution — and service provision. Disaggregate rather than conflate various Sunni Islamist groups by: Use military and policing tools judiciously and in compliance with local laws and norms by: Disaggregate rather than conflate various Sunni Islamist groups, and work with those willing to engage in peace talks and operate within the political process.

Brussels, 2 February I. Al-Qaeda in Yemen Yemen has long grabbed headlines as a hotbed for al-Qaeda AQ activity, and indeed it holds a special place in jihadist eschatology. Hide Footnote The history of AQ and related movements in Yemen is tied to both domestic politics and shifting trends in global jihadism.

The Fourth Wave A. Uprising During the uprising, AQAP evolved from a primarily internationally focused jihadist organisation to one with a significant local insurgency component, seeking to strike deeper roots into Yemeni society and establish territorial control. Hide Footnote Only a week after the Saudi-led coalition began attacking Huthi-Saleh forces from the air, AQAP moved once again to capture territory, this time in the eastern governorate of Hadramout.

Hide Footnote B. Hide Footnote After being evicted from Abyan, the group applied lessons from its experience there to Mukalla.

Yemen: Coalition’s Blocking Aid, Fuel Endangers Civilians

Hide Footnote 2. Huthi expansion, sectarianism and new alliances Arguably, AQAP has most benefited from a combination of Huthi military expansion and growing sectarianism, as these have opened new opportunities for forging local alliances. Facebook Email. Their [Islamic State] brutal tactics, including mass killings and mosque bombings, and their relatively autocratic style, are at odds with societal and tribal norms.

Loading Video. What went wrong in the deadly raid on al-Qaeda in Yemen? PBS NewsHour. Originally published in The Guardian. Up Next. A member of the Tunisian security forces stands guard at the site of a suicide attack in the Tunisian capital Tunis on 29 October, What do we know about what happened, and who was behind the attack? How significant is this attack? Yes, I Agree. You'll get alerts delivered directly to your inbox each time something noteworthy happens in the Military community.

By giving us your email, you are opting in to our Newsletter: Sign up for the Early Bird Brief. It's unclear who was on board the Marines' Osprey. In late-December, infantry Marines with the unit's battalion landing team conducted a mock helicopter raid as part of an exercise in east Africa.

Typically, U. Marines are used in one of two ways when supporting such surgical counter-terror missions: The raid involved Marines inserting onto an objective via MV Ospreys and CHE Super Stallions, neutralizing simulated enemy threats onsite, and performing a thorough site exploitation of enemy intelligence before extracting all forces from the area, along with apprehended high-value individuals. But, he cautioned, "take reports of female casualties with a grain of salt.

Yemen: Coalition’s Blocking Aid, Fuel Endangers Civilians | Human Rights Watch

Not all female casualties are civilian casualties in many cases, and certainly with this one. Though far from routine, militant groups have employed women in various capacities, including to carry out suicide attacks, said Michael S. Smith II, a terrorism analyst who has advised Congress on the subject.

There's big-picture strategic value in doing so, he added. Whenever Western military forces kill female combatants, the groups with which they're affiliated seek to exploit their deaths for propaganda. For all of al-Qaida's activity in Yemen, these reports of women picking up arms are unprecedented, said Jessica Davis, author of " Women in Modern Terrorism. It could be an evolution in the group's tactics," she added, "but I'd hesitate to draw that conclusion based on one incident.

It is unlikely the raid force had prior intelligence suggesting women were among the group of fighters they would encounter in al Bayda, a U. And while it's unusual to encounter women as trained combatants, U. Nor should they, Smith said. Does the prospect of killing female combatants pose a potential moral dilemma for American troops? Perhaps, he said.